#### Their kritik does not challenge the public and private dichotomy that has been accepted and seen as neutral – means that without civil society there are NO protections for the feminine other in the home such as domestic abuse victims –

**Peterson in 2000**

V. Spike Peterson. “Rereading Public and Private: The Dichotomy that is Not One1” SAIS Review. Vol 20, Num 2. Pp 11-29. Summer-Fall 2000.

 In Homer and Thucydides, **the meanings of public and private are delineated in relation to the demands of war and the moral dilemmas they pose.** In this sense**, their accounts link the state’s external affairs to “impossible” internal dilemmas.** In contrast, the most familiar account of public and private, provided by Aristotle, avoids the question of war and external affairs. Instead of a tragic choice between competing but parallel claims to loyalty, **Aristotle “resolves” the dilemma by privileging the public sphere over the private.** Here, **the public realm of politics constitutes the highest association, a realm of freedom and equality, where citizens pursue the good life. This higher realm depends upon but encompasses the private sphere, which is characterized not by freedom but necessity, and involves not equal but naturally hierarchical relationships.** In this account**, the public sphere of free, equal, reasoning citizens is masculinized by the exclusion of women and feminized characteristics, while the private sphere of contingency, inequality, and emotional attachments is feminized by the relegation of women and characteristics of femininity to it. This is the “model” of public and private most frequently assumed in the Western tradition of social and political theory.** **Arguably its greatest significance is in defining the boundary and elevating the status of “politics”: the dichotomy distinguishes what is deemed political and therefore what is politicized. That which is associated with the private sphere is denied the status of being political, hence, denied the important sense of being contingent** (not given), contestable (not fixed), **and of collective interest** (not simply personal). **Not only do we inherit a bounded domain of citizenship and political power, but we also inherit a subordinated sphere of naturalized inequality.** Or so we assume. What Aristotle intended is the subject of ongoing debate, but he is clear about the interdependence of public and private, which is often lost in modern accounts.14 This interdependence was both emotional and economic. The public sphere depended as much on the cultivation of virtue, love, and emotional attachments15 as it did on the economic productivity of the oikos (household). Hence, on the one hand, Aristotle’s account is more complex and less binary than conventionally assumed. On the other, however, his characterization does establish the hierarchy of public over private (and masculine over feminine), and his avoidance of war and external affairs and omission of (non-oikos) market exchanges introduce differently problematic simplifications.

#### Wilderson constructs an ungendered black subject which fails to accurately describe violence against black flesh and ignores the female black body

**Hodges 2012** – Asia Hodges University of California Irvine, African American Studies, [*Mama’s Baby & the Black Gender Problematic*](http://www.academia.edu/2027925/Mamas_Baby_and_the_Black_Gender_Problematic)

<http://www.academia.edu/2027925/Mamas_Baby_and_the_Black_Gender_Problematic>

Asia Nichole Hodges Undergraduate Critical Theory Conference 2012 Mentor: Tamara Beauchamp Mama’s Baby & the Black Gender Problematic For me, this paper represents an opportunity to bring focus to the ungendered black subject of afropessimist thought, a concept I was first introduced to in winter quarter of 2011, which was the most theoretically rich coursework I have ever undertaken. In retrospect, the work of Frank Wilderson, III also appeared at a very critical moment in my development, both as a thinker and as a black woman engaged in organizing around issues affecting the black community on campus as well as back home. Afropessimist thought resonated deeply because it spoke to the terrifying truths of antiblack racism, black structural positionality and black life, corroborating my own experience but more importantly providing the language and a framework through which to approach a more thorough explanation of this experience theoretically. Further, when I use the term ‘’black” I mean it in the sense closest to the truth of the paradigm of afropessimist thought as described by Wilderson in Red, White & Black: Cinema & the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms. It is my intent to critique Wilderson’s argument for an ungendered black subject using the work of black feminist scholar, Hortense Spillers, and explore the categories she protects in her work. She is indispensible here not only because she was an impetus for Wilderson’s project, but also because it was her thought that mothered my own. In conversation with the seminal article of Hortense Spillers, Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe: An American Grammar Book, Wilderson explains that, for him, antiblackness functions as a prohibition on gender, thus the black subject is inherently genderless. He writes, “Gratuitous violence relegates the Slave to the taxonomy, the list of things. That is, it reduces the Slave to an object. Motherhood, fatherhood, and gender differentiations can only be sustained in the taxonomy of subjects.”1 While this framework has helped me to understand of the structuring properties of violence, and grasp its role in subject formation more generally, this explanation features an ungendered black subject and cannot be extended to the truth of my life as a black and as a female. This is not to say that afropessimism does not hold the potential to speak to the effect of antiblackness on gender. To the contrary, it was Spillers who first argued that such work was fruitful, writing that in “undressing these conflations of meaning, as they appear under the rule of dominance… we would gain… the potential for gender differentiation as it might express itself along a range of stress points, including human biology in its intersection with the project of culture.”2 Both Wilderson and Spillers take the dereliction of the black from civil society as their point of departure, but in many ways, Spillers has offered us a great deal more than we know what to do with on Wilderson, III, Frank B., Red, White & Black: Cinema and the Structure of U.S. Antagonisms. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010, 136. 2 Spillers, Hortense. "Mama's Baby, Papa's Maybe."Diacritics. (1987): 66. Print. 1 matters of gender and antiblackness. In Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe she theorizes that there is a profundity to the particularities of the position of the female black that is exemplified through regimes of naming. In the spirit of black feminism, though its ensemble of questions cannot help me here, I must occasion an explanation of black positionality that accounts for the manner of existential negation and the modes of violence which position me, moving beyond the concerns with black patriarchy. Theoretically, antiblackness does not only lend itself to an argument against a gendered understanding of my condition, it also offers an opportunity for a more nuanced understanding of gender itself. This begs the question, what does a genderless black subject help us to understand that a more complicated rendering [or gendering] of the black subject would obscure? In my view, black political thought lags here, unable to describe its condition without relegating the particularities of the female black to the abyss. Moreover, it seems the black female labors in service of civil society in ways we have yet to fully understand. Spillers supports an argument for the necessity of this work in building a more robust theoretical foundation for black political thought, and afropessimism could be our point of departure. For Wilderson, there is a line of recognition and incorporation. Above it are human beings, civil society made up of white men and women, and below it is the black in absolute dereliction, a concept he draws from Frantz Fanon writings on the black condition. I mean to suggest that the distinction we’re looking for under the line of recognition and incorporation is not “man” and “woman”, which Wilderson would reject, but that is not to say there is no distinction to be made whatsoever. It seems we may too hastily disregard the possibility for distinction for three reasons, described loosely as outlined by Spillers: 1) there was no distinction made between male and female slaves on the ships, 2) men and women performed the same hard, physical labor and lastly, 3) gender is a category requiring the symbolic integrity from which the black is barred. I am unable to go into each in detail here, but the validity of these points of contention is not what is in question for Spillers. The distinctions made on ships or on fields are not the only sites we should scourer for insight into the black gender problematic, and evidence that captives are not regarded as “men” and “women,” like their captors, is elucidating but not explanatory. In Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe, Spillers uses naming as a point of entry into black gender problematic. She revisits Daniel Patrick Moynihan’s report on the state of the black community in America during the late 1960s, and meditates on the significance of black women emerging as the locus of black pathology. She writes that for Moynihan, “the ‘Negro Family’ has no Father to speak of—his Name, his Symbolic function mark the impressive missing agencies in the essential life of the black community… and it is, surprisingly, the fault of the Daughter, or the female line”. Thus, it is the “displacing [of] the Name and the Law of the father to the territory of the Mother and Daughter [that] becomes an aspect of the African-American female’s misnaming.”3 The black is without the gendered symbolic integrity that the subjects of civil society enjoy; the black performs to both genders, as well as anything in between and beyond, and is not granted the protections of motherhood or the entitlements of fatherhood for example. Moynihan observes the behavior of the black family and concludes that it is a manifestation of the backwardness of blackness generally, and the pathology of black women in particular. But a structural analysis would include a discussion of historical context, relations to power and positionality, with an understanding of the black as positioned through the violence of captivity. Moreover, the emergence of the female black marks the divergence between chattel slavery and racial slavery. Peter Wood, professor of history at Duke University, explains that partus sequitir ventrem, “that which is brought forth follows the womb”, is a legal doctrine which mandates that the child follows the status of the mother, or rather in the case of the female black, her child is doomed to captivity. Woods notes that there was a “shift from indentured servitude to lifelong slavery to heredity slavery, where not only am I enslaved but my children as well” and emphasizes that it was indeed “a remarkable shift”4. However, the problem is not that we do not know this history, but rather we have not dealt with it theoretically, and even in the most likely 3 4 Ibid, 66. of discourses, particularity on the basis of sex is not explored. In chapter 11 of Red, White and Black, Wilderson takes up the issue of gender and sex under captivity, but largely leaves the work Spillers does in Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe untouched. Earlier in the chapter, she is employed as support for Wilderson’s claim that the position of white women and black females are made distinct as a direct consequence of captivity. However, when Wilderson addresses blackness and gender, specifically gender ontology and the reification of gender, Spillers absence is haunting. Moreover, the effect of captivity on gender is not simply a reversal of power between the categories of “man” and “woman” as suggested by Moynihan, but rather that these categories are in fact eviscerated entirely where the black is concerned. Though the black does not hold the symbolic integrity for gender normativity, as argued by both Wilderson and Spillers, the categories of male and female are still apt here; “man” and “woman” representing the body and the latter, eviscerated categories, representing Spillers’ notion of the flesh. She writes: Before there is the ‘body’ there is the ‘flesh,’ that zero degree of social conceptualization that does not escape concealment under the brush of discourse, or the reflexes of iconography. Even though the European hegemonies stole bodies—some of them female… we regard this human and social irreparability as high crimes against the flesh, as a person of African females and African males registered the wounding. 5 Here, Spillers shows that the violence of captivity registers on multiple levels, and of course that the violence can be understood from multiple registers, however the flesh that registers the wounding is sexed, the violence at times sexualized. So how, then, does the female black function within the structure, positioned through regimes of sexualized violence? My project is to seek answers to the questions developed here by acquiescing to the chasms in our understanding. I do not aim to fill the chasm here, but only to make the conceptual leap and let the matter remain unresolved so that we might titter on the edge and engage further with the black gender problematic. To conclude, the closing thoughts of Spillers in Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe, “The female breaks in upon the imagination with a forcefulness that marks both a denial and an ‘illegitimacy’… In this play of paradox, only the female stands in the flesh, both mother and mother-dispossessed. This problematizing of gender places her, in my view, out of the traditional symbolics of female gender, and it is our task to make a place for this different social subject.“ 5 Spillers, 67.

**Men have to acknowledge their system of unearned privileges especially in the classroom in order to advance any form of communication.**

(SPF)

**Schacht** (steven, self-identified radical feminist queer who is an associate professor of sociology and women's studies teaching associate at Plattsburgh State , “Teaching About Being An Oppressor: Some Personal and Political Considerations” http://www.nostatusquo.com/Schacht/teaching.html)

Isn't it Amazing the Things One Might Ascertain?

**We live in a society where ignorance** truly **is bliss**, especially **for those with unearned male privilege** and status, **which** in turn often pr**ovides men with an excuse to deny the existence of the** very real and **harmful sexist hierarchical realities that surround us and the active role men must play in their maintenance.** While some men are willing to admit that women are disadvantaged in our society, very **few men are willing to acknowledge that they are over-privileged** (McIntosh 2000). After all, **to actually do so would mean that men would not only have to admit the unearned and unjust basis of their advantage but perhaps even personally change and give-up some of their privilege. In the highly competitive world we live in giving up any advantages--**earned or unearned--**one might have in the game of life would seem foolish at best to the vast majority men.¶** And yet, as a partner, a mother, a sister, a daughter or just a friend, most men have significant women in their lives that they deeply care about, love, and sometimes even view as equals. I believe herein lies the true promise of the feminist pedagogy that I bring to my classes. **Instead of abstractly talking about male dominance and women's subordination, I attempt to put a face on oppression. I offer my own experiences of doing unearned male privilege, and recognize the harm it inflicted on others--both female and male. Often courageous male students will also offer their experiences of doing male dominance. In all classroom discussions female students freely and frequently offer their experiences of being oppressed by men. Combined with constant reminders by me that the "who's" and "what's" we are talking about are our partners, parents, siblings, children, friends, and each of us, emerges lived images of the oppressor and oppressed**. **These "faces" of sort demonstrate how all too common oppression is, how harmful it is for so many, and why each of us--women and men--should join together to bring about its end.¶ By making men aware of the unearned advantages that society confers upon them, coupled with** the knowledge **of how this is oppressive** to the significant women in their lives, many men are left in an ideological bind: how can they personally express concern and respect for the welfare of these women all the while supporting realities that cause women's oppression in larger societal settings? While I realistically have no meaningful way to measure the answer to this question, I have witnessed many men (although admittedly not all) in my classes very much loosen the otherwise firm grip they have on justifying and living the male privilege that society so unjustly confers upon them. A world without unearned male privilege would be a significant step in the pursuit of a non-oppressive, egalitarian future.

#### White male oppression is the root cause of racial oppression

**Katie, Sept 22 2005** (Student in English and French at Minnesota, <http://macthirdwave.blogspot.com/2005/09/lesbianism-act-of-resistance.html>, Lesbianism: an Act of Resistance)

Lesbianism: an Act of Resistance

Before I summarize my chapter from This Bridge Called My Back, here are some key concepts and terms:
**Predatory heterosexuality: the system by which patriarchal institutions dominate women through “coerced” heterosexuality based on heteronormativity. Heteronormativity: the concept that social institutions reinforce the idea that the traditional gender roles based on the heterosexual relationship are the only natural ways for people to exist within both their gender and sex. Slave-master relationship: this describes the relationship between black people and white people, respectively, based on the legacy of slavery in the United States; also related to the relationship between women and men.** In her essay “Lesbianism: an Act of Resistance,” poet and author Cheryl Clarke spends a lot of time articulating the similarities between women’s oppression and the oppression of African Americans in the United States at the hands of the white capitalist male. Drawing parallels between the experiences of lesbians and the experiences of many black people, and in agreement with Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s analysis, Clarke concludes that “racism and sexism have been produced by the same animal: ‘the white Saxon man’” (131). More specifically, in terms of women’s oppression, Clarke claims that men use the institution of heterosexuality to control women. Through “coerced heterosexuality,” and by claiming that sex between a man and a woman is the only ‘natural’ sexual and romantic relationship, “male-supremacist institutions insure their own perpetuity and control over [women]” (130). Furthermore, she argues, the white man learned how to relate to black people based on his existing relationship to women under the system of patriarchal heterosexual monogamy, viewing them both “as property, as a sexual commodity, as a servant, as a source of free or cheap labor, and as an innately inferior being” (131). Despite this similar oppression, however, Clarke points out the inability of many black men to identify sexism as inextricable from racism and from the black woman’s oppression, and that predatory heterosexuality is the root of what Clarke calls the “slave-master relationship” that has always existed between white and black people. Because of the misogyny and blatant heterosexual superiority complex among these black men, the black lesbian is not only socially marginalized on the basis of her skin, but also alienated from the black political community by the homophobic sexism of her black male peers. Therefore, Clarke believes strongly in the power lesbians hold in undermining the oppression of all women, claiming that lesbian-feminism has the capacity of “reversing and transforming…predatory heterosexuality” ////////////////(134). With this conviction, Clarke turns her attention to the divide between black and white feminists and to the taboo surrounding interracial lesbian relationships. Criticizing her feminist peers for adamantly opposing all white feminists and questioning black lesbians’ “commitment to the liberation of black women” if they happen to sleep with a white woman, Clarke calls on her peers to “accept or reject allies on the basis of politics not…of skin color” (135). Furthermore, since black women and white women enter relationships with a history of competitive oppression, lesbian-feminists who defy the taboo of interracial homosexual relationships begin the process of reframing the historical context of their interaction, of “transform[ing] the history of relationships between black women and white women” (136). Clarke concludes that the ultimate resistance for both black and white lesbians is to stop fighting, and start loving each other as lovers and allies in the fight against racist heteronormative oppression.

#### The negative’s homogenous identification of Women of decedents from Africa is exactly the same move that white feminists use to exclude voices

**Mohanty 1988**

[Chandra Talpade ,Associate Professor of Women's Studies at Hamilton College, New York,

and Core Faculty at the Union Institute Graduate School, Cincinnati. “Under Western Eyes: Feminist

Scholarship and Colonial” *Feminist Review*, No. 30., Autumn,, JSTOR]

Similarly, **examine statements like: 'My analysis will start by stating that all African women are politically and economically dependent'** (Cutrufelli, 1983: especially 13). Or: 'Nevertheless, either overtly or covertly, prostitution is still the main if not the only source of work for African women' (Cutrufelli, 1983: 33). All African women are dependent. Prostitution is the only work option for African women as a group. Both statements are illustrative of generalizations sprinkled liberally through a recent Zed Press publication, Women of Africa: Roots of Oppression, by Maria Rosa Cutrufelli, who is described on the cover as an 'Italian Writer, Sociologist, Marxist and Feminist'. In the 1980s is it possible to imagine writing a book entitled 'Women of Europe: Roots of Oppression'? **I am not objecting to the use of universal groupings for descriptive purposes. Women from the continent of Africa can be descriptively characterized as 'Women of Africa'. It is when 'women of Africa' becomes a homogeneous sociological grouping characterized by common dependencies or powerlessness (or even strengths) that problems arise — we say too little and too much at the same time. This is because descriptive gender differences are transformed into the division between men and women**. Women are constituted as a group via dependency relationships vis-a-vis men, who are implicitly held responsible for these relationships. **When 'women of Africa' (versus 'men of Africa' as a group?) are seen as a group precisely because they are generally dependent and oppressed, the analysis of specific historical differences becomes impossible, because reality is always apparently structured by divisions between two mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive groups, the victims and the oppressors**. Here the sociological is substituted for the biological in order, however, to create the same — a unity of women. Thus, it is not the descriptive potential of gender difference but the privileged positioning and explanatory potential of gender difference as the origin of oppression that I question. **In using 'women of Africa' (as an already constituted group of oppressed peoples) as a category of analysis, Cutrufelli denies any historical specificity to the location of women as subordinate, powerful, marginal, central, or otherwise, vis-a-vis particular social and power networks. Women are taken as a unified 'powerless' group prior to the historical and political analysis in question. Thus, it is then merely a matter of specifying the context after the fact. 'Women' are now placed in the context of the family, or in the workplace, or within religious networks, almost as if these systems existed outside the relations of women with other women, and women with men**

#### The aff’s activist mothering approach is one that allows for an investigation of intersectional approaches without privileging one over the other

**Ackelsberg 2001** – Professor of Women and Gender Studies at Smith College, PhD in Women and Gender Studies from Princeton University, *(Re)Conceiving Politics? Women's Activism and Democracy in a Time of Retrenchment Grassroots Warriors: Activist Mothering, Community Work, and the War on Poverty* by Nancy A. Naples; Community Activism and Feminist Politics: Organizing across Race, Class, and Gender by Nancy A. Naples; No Middle Ground: Women and Radical Protest by Kathleen Blee; The Politics of Motherhood: Activist Voices from Left to Right by Alexis Jetter; Annelise Orleck; Diana Taylor; Crazy for Democracy: Women in Grassroot … Review by: Martha Ackelsberg Feminist Studies, Vol. 27, No. 2 (Summer, 2001), pp. 391-418

Published by: Feminist Studies, Inc. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3178766 .

Nancy A. Naples's Grassroots Warriors: Activist Mothering, Community Work, and the War on Poverty is a fascinating exploration of the lives and activities of women who were involved in community- based organizations in New York and Philadelphia during the War on Poverty (roughly 1964 to 1974). Her core data are made up of interviews she conducted with approximately sixty of these women and through which she attempted to explore questions such as what motivated them to undertake community work in their neighborhoods; how did race, class, and gender intersect in their political biographies-and their consciousness; how did bureaucratization and professionalization affect their participation; and how did the changing political economy and political culture affect their work (p. 3). From our current political vantage point, when virtually all discourse about social welfare policy focuses on "welfare reform," Naples raises a fascinating question: what

was the role of the state in shaping women's "community work" and/or in creating or expanding arenas for citizenship? The idea that the state might actually create, rather than effectively constrict, opportunities for citizenship offers a refreshing change from contemporary political realities. One of the most valuable aspects of this study, then, is its evocation of a different political-economic moment, when "maximum feasible participation of the poor" rather than "ending welfare as we know it" was the watchword of social policy. Naples explores the impact of that differing policy context on the poor women who were the primary actors at the local level, examining their routes into activism through what she terms "activist mothering," the ways they were changed by their participation, and the ways their participation affected their understandings of themselves as (previously non-) political beings. "Activist mothering," she writes, "highlights the community workers' gendered conceptualization of activism on behalf of their communities. .. . Central to their constructions of 'community' was a convergence of racial-ethnic identification and class affiliation." "Activist mothering," therefore, "includes self-conscious struggles against racism, sexism, and poverty" (p. 114) Being a mother, however, does not automatically generate an oppositional consciousness; in fact, Naples's informants point to a number of different paths into activism, including religious involvement (particularly for Black women and those involved in the Catholic Worker movement), social work, radical politics, participation in other social movements (e.g., the civil rights movement), and Black women's traditions of community caretaking. Interestingly, most of these activists did not identify themselves as "politically engaged" and made a separation between what they understood as their "community work" and what they identified as "politics" (by which they seemed to mean voting, lobbying their elected officials, and so forth). These women saw their community work as simply "a logical extension of their desire to improve the lives of their families and neighbors," what Temma Kaplan originally defined as "female consciousness."' Yet, Naples argues, their "gendered identities as women, daughters, mothers, or workers intersected with racial, ethnic, class, professional, and political identities to create a complex and oftentimes contradictory set of forces that informed their consciousness of inequality as well as motivation to fight for social and economic justice" (p. 181). Many were profoundly changed by their experiences, coming to see themselves as "community workers" and then as empowered citizens, with a right and an obligation to act on behalf of their communities and to make claims against the state. Significantly, Naples attempts to draw lessons from that time for our own. Thus, she notes, "the War on Poverty, with its emphasis on maximum feasible participation, transformed their previously unpaid community work into paid work and, at the same time, empowered them as residents of low-income communities- resulting in a merging of social and political citizenship" (p. 199). Yet, she recognizes the limits of this strategy as well: increasing pressure for professionalization limited the ongoing participation (and influence) of these community workers even in the "heyday" of the War on Poverty. Furthermore, the state that had facilitated politicization and empowerment through its policies could, by cutting back those same programs, limit and virtually eliminate the women's participation. Naples acknowledges the "contradictions of state-sponsored, community-based employment" as a strategy to end poverty, both economic and political. But, she insists, the contemporary move away from income supports and the "fragmentation of social life into discrete policy arenas fails to capture the mutually constitutive relationships between family income, childcare, health care, housing, education, employment, and so forth" (p. 195). Effective social policies to combat poverty must address the interconnections among these problems and must recognize not just women's "double duty" of paid employment and care for household and family, but a third component, as well: "community work." Only when that work is recognized, validated, and compensated, and when women's contributions in that arena are effectively incorporated into our social policies, are we likely to make any real progress toward a more democratic and egalitarian society.8

#### And, the nuclear industry and the state have used science and “experts” to dictate what is objective, rational and valid knowledge silencing female activist the same way the colonizer has erased the black body deeming it illegitimate. Reorientation toward gynocentric logic rejects the notion that there is capital T truth and opens space for the personal, everyday voice. The 1AC Nhanege evidence indicates that these forms of phallic logic is inherent in our societal thinking shaping all forms of power relations. Starting from the question of sexual difference to understand whiteness is critical to challenging hegemonic thinking

**Martinot 2007** [Steven, “Motherhood and the Invention of Race,” *Hypatia* 22.2]

**The creation of matrilineal servitude status, the insidious division of women against one another in the interests of wealth and property, expressed nothing more actual or exigent than colonial greed. Antmiscegenation statutes extended racial categories to the human body as property**. **Together, the legislation of motherhood and sexuality transformed property by extending the body as property to the body as production. The two coalesced as slavery and a structure of racialization, by which the English derogated people of color and defined themselves as white**. Structurally, these enactments together engendered a cyclic process. Sexuality, seized as property in Africans and desexualized as propriety for the English, extended the body as production to commodified personhood. **Commodified personhood formed the grounds for the codification of slavery and the transformation of colonial allegiance** (through paranoia and enforced social solidarity) **into a structure of racialization whose ultimate product was white social identity. Slavery, the ultimate extension of the body as property, gives all interpersonal relations a commodified character that through racialization renders all forms of personhood a matter of property. This cycle continually reproduces race, whiteness, and white supremacy, in which political enactment, paramilitary activity, the use of economic and financial power, and the instrumentalization of women have always been deployed together**. **Throughout their many redefinitions, race, sexuality, gender, and nation have been mutually conditioning in the production of American whiteness and in the construction of a white nation**. As Roberts argues, **at the confluence of motherhood, race, and white supremacy, the state’s persecution of a black woman /////////will § Marked 21:27 § not only extend its control over childbearing, but reinstate the biologization of race at the same time** (1997, 20). What colonial white society did to African women through matrilineal statues (to construct structures of racialization), contemporary white society does to **Regina McKnight[’s]** through charges of murder. Her **personhood and motherhood are not violently divided against each other legally because the state is rehearsing or reconstituting a form of matrilinearity; the violence done to her is in the service of reenacting the structures of white supremacy that emerged from matrilinearity**. For the state to have provided medical care or humane labor conditions would have been unintelligible for it. Instead, the state imprints outlaw status and servitude on McKnight’s body to sanctify its withholding of humane conditions, as the reconstitution of a white social consensus. Because the state could repeat this cycle with respect to McKnight, it could use her and other black women (through the instrumentalization of black motherhood) to reinscribe social racialization and its own white identity. In this sense, the McKnight case is the direct legacy of the seventeenth-century 96 Hypatia invention of race itself. Repeating the redefinition of gender and sexuality of three hundred years earlier, the condemnation of McKnight echoes the colonial condemnation of the black pregnant body—restructuring race through a paranoia (the threat of criminalized black people), white solidarity (allegiance to the law), and practices of arbitrary and gratuitous violence.

**Wilderson relies upon Fanon’s use of psychoanalytic reasoning to explain libidinal racism**

**Wilderson 10**

(Frank B. Wilderson, “Wallowing in the contradictions”, Part 1, <http://percy3.wordpress.com/2010/07/09/frank-b-wilderson-%E2%80%9Cwallowing-in-the-contradictions%E2%80%9D-part-1/>, Interview with Percy Howard)

PH As a Psychotherapist, I was very interested to see your contrasting Frantz Fanon and Lacan concerning their conceptualizations of potential paths to “emancipation in the libidinal economy”, as you put it. I am ashamed to admit that I have never read Fanon, but have read Lacan. Please illuminate your idea that the stark difference in their conceptualizations of conflict/antagonism differ are based on the fact that Lacan would still see Blacks as fundamentally situated in personhood, but that Fannon (and yourself) see Blacks as “situated a priori in absolute dereliction”. FW This is a big question, too big for a concise answer—I think I take about thirty to forty pages to try and get my head around this in the book. But the key to the answer lies in the concept of “contemporaries.” Fanon rather painfully and meticulously shows us how the human race is a community of “contemporaries.” In addition, this community vouchsafes its coherence (it knows its borders) through the presence of Blacks. If Blacks became part of the human community then the concept of “contemporaries” would have no outside; and if it had no outside it could have no inside. Lacan assumes the category and thus he imagines the analysand’s problem in terms of how to live without neurosis among ones contemporaries. Fanon interrogates the category itself. For Lacan the analysands suffer psychically due to problems extant within the paradigm of contemporaries. For Fanon, the analysand suffers due to the existence of the contemporaries themselves and the fact that s/he is a stimulus for anxiety for those who have contemporaries. Now, a contemporary’s struggles are conflictual—that is to say, they can be resolved because they are problems that are of- and in the world. But a Blacks problems are the stuff of antagonisms: struggles that cannot be resolved between parties but can only be resolved through the obliteration of one or both of the parties. **We are faced—when dealing with the Black—with a set of psychic problems that cannot be resolved through any form of symbolic intervention** such as psychoanalysis—**though addressing them psychoanalytically we can begin toexplain the antagonism (as I have done in my book, and as Fanon does**), but it won’t lead us to a cure.

**Fanon’s racialized Black subject is built upon the exclusion of potential femininities – it takes male as the norm**

Bergner 95

Who Is That Masked Woman? Or, the Role of Gender in Fanon's Black Skin, White Masks Author(s): Gwen Bergner Reviewed work(s): Source: PMLA, Vol. 110, No. 1, Special Topic: Colonialism and the Postcolonial Condition (Jan., 1995), pp. 75-88

Though Black Skin, **White Masks is a founda- tional text for reconfiguring psychoanalysis to ac- count for race, Fanon, like Freud, takes the male as the norm**. **For the exemplary colonized subject, Fanon uses the term le noir 'the black man.**' **This masculine "universal" refers not to humankind gen- erally, however, but to actual men-since Fanon describes these colonized subjects as studying in Paris, lusting after white women, and competing with white men for intellectual recognition**. The French-educated Martinican who appropriates the superiority of the colonizing culture by ostenta- tiously wielding proper French is, by assumption, male: "When he marries, his wife will be aware that she is marrying a joke" 'marie, sa femme saura qu'elle epouse une histoire' (25; 39). **That Fanon's"universal" subject describes the colonized male in particular indicates that racial identities intersect with sexual difference**. Fanon does not ignore sex- ual difference altogether, but he explores sexual- ity's role in constructing race only through rigid categories of gender. In Black Skin, White Masks, **women are consid- ered as subjects almost exclusively in terms of their sexual relationships with men**; feminine de- sire is thus defined as an overly literal and limited (hetero)sexuality. But though feminine subjectivity clearly deserves broader description, the dimen- sions of its confinement within Black Skin, White Masks indicate the architecture of raced masculin- ity and femininity in the colonial context. So while it is not surprising that Fanon, writing in the early fifties, takes the masculine as the norm, it is neces- sary not only to posit alternative representations of femininity but also to consider how his account of normative raced masculinity depends on the pro- duction or exclusion of femininities. By examining the role of gender in Black Skin, White Masks, I aim to broaden Fanon's outline of black women's subjectivity and to work toward delineating the in- terdependence of race and gender. **Although they may emanate from a common construction of oth- erness in psychoanalytic discourses**,6 **racial differ- ence and sexual difference intersect and interact in contextually variable ways that preclude separate or determinist description**.7 **Relying on feminist psychoanalytic theory as a model for revising the discourse of psychoanalysis from within, I hope to review Fanon's construction of gender while illu- minating the contributions of his psychoanalytic framework of racial identity**. Fanon's almost mythical significance for post- colonial theorists and, more recently, for others gesturing toward multicultural contexts nearly fore- stalls a gender critique of Black Skin, White Masks. In an article tracing Fanon's recuperation as a "global theorist," Gates notes that Fanon is mobi- lized as an "ethnographic construct" and is used as "both totem and text" to model a "unified theory of oppression" (459, 457, 470). **Figuring Fanon as transcultural and transhistorical means that "in the course of an appeal for the specificity of the Other, we discover that [Fanon as the] global theorist of alterity is emptied of his own specificity**" (459). These invocations do not lead to critical analyses of his work but make the colonial paradigm the "last bastion for the project, and dream, of global the- ory" (469-70). According to Gates, **pressing Fanon into the service of a "global theory" of colonialism produces either a "sentimental romance of alterity" complete with a utopian vision of fully achieved in- dependence from the colonial relation or a conception of that relation as a closed, inescapable system. For Gates, these incompatible positions structure the central conflict within colonial discourse the- ory: the tension between utopian narratives of liber- ation and deterministic models of subject formation and discourse formation**. To unlock this binary, Gates proposes a more grounded approach that would "historicize" Fanon through biographical critique. Gates would weigh, for example, reports that Fanon did not identify with and even found distasteful the common people of the cultures he championed theoretically and politically. This recourse to the "factual" authority of biog- raphy may demythologize the man but does not disprove his theory or resolve the dilemmas of co- lonial discourse analysis. Fanon's alienation from the local and the "low" is in fact the subject of Black Skin, White Masks; the dialectic between solidarity with and alienation from the colonized population is integral to his analysis of the colo- nially educated black man's psychology. Rather than historicize Fanon, **I want to challenge post- colonialism's uses of him and to encourage a deeper engagement with issues of gender-not to consti- tute a better "unified theory of oppression**" (Gates 470) **but to question the dominant practice of "separate but equal" psychoanalytic discourses of race and gender**.